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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Reducing the United States Trade
Imbalance with Japan: Equal Access for
United States Securities Dealers
The way to resolve trade problems is to seek open, not closed, markets;
to seek multilateral negotiation, not unilateral legislation.
Ronald Reagan'
I. THE UNITED STATES-JAPAN TRADE IMBALANCE
The trade deficit between the United States and Japan, while re-
cently decreasing, remains over $52 billion.2 This trade deficit ac-
counts for a substantial amount of the total United States trade
deficit, which in 1988 was $119 billion.3 There are a number of rea-
sons why the United States trade deficit with Japan remains at such a
high level. The United States has claimed that this trade deficit is a
result of both formal and informal Japanese barriers to trade, while
the Japanese point to United States trade barriers, uncompetitive
United States products, and complacent attitudes and inadequate ef-
forts of United States industry to improve performance. 4 However,
the actual cause of the trade deficit appears to be the massive federal
budget deficit of the United States. 5 As the largest debtor nation in
1. President Reagan's News Conference Following the Tokyo Economic Summit, 22
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DoC. 588, 589 (May 7, 1986).
2. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Foreign Trade Data Service
(1989).
3. Id. For example, the total trade deficits for the United States since 1980 are as fol-
lows: 1988 - $119 billion; 1987 - $152 billion; 1986 - $138 billion; 1985 - $117 billion; 1984 -
$106 billion; 1983 - $52 billion; 1982 - $27 billion; 1981 - $22 billion; 1980 - $19 billion. By
comparison, the United States trade deficits with Japan in those years were as follows: 1988 -
$52 billion; 1987 - $56 billion; 1986 - $55 billion; 1985 - $46 billion; 1984 - $33 billion; 1983 -
$19 billion; 1982 - $16 billion; 1981 - $15 billion; 1980 - $10 billion. Id.
4. United States-Japan Economic Relations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int. Fi-
nance, Trade and Monetary Policy of the House Comm. on Banking Finance, and Urban Af-
fairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1987) [hereinafter Economic Relations Hearing] (statement of
Allan I. Mendelowitz, Senior Associate Director, General Accounting Office).
5. Id. at 65. As a result of increased budget deficits, the federal debt of the United States
increased from $936.7 billion in 1980 to $2.555 trillion in 1988. 67 FED. RESERVE BULL. A32,
table 1.40 (Dec. 1981); 75 FED. RESERVE BULL. A30, table 1.40 (Jan. 1989).
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the world, the United States has turned to foreign capital to finance
this budget deficit. 6 As a result, Japan, the world's largest creditor
nation, has supplied funds which United States capital markets
require.
7
The United States Congress and leading economists agree that
the only way to reduce the trade deficit between the two countries is
to reduce the federal budget deficit. 8 However, there continues to be
disagreement as to the method. 9 It is certain that until an effective
federal budget deficit reduction plan is successfully implemented, re-
ductions through other methods must continue. One such method is
to eliminate entry barriers to Japanese securities markets. Elimina-
tion of such barriers could increase United States competition in Japa-
nese markets thus allowing United States securities firms to capture a
larger share. The result would be an inflow of capital to the United
States economy, substantially reducing the trade deficit. 10
This Comment examines both Japanese and United States securi-
ties laws as they apply to securities dealers of the other country. Em-
phasis is placed upon the specific Japanese restrictions imposed on
United States securities firms, which if eliminated could substantially
reduce the trade imbalance between the two countries. After compar-
ing these restrictions, this Comment addresses the United States' re-
cent attempt to eliminate such restrictions through a policy of
protectionism. Finally, this Comment proposes that rather than try
to force equal access though protectionist policies, the United States
should negotiate a bilateral agreement with Japan which would grant
equal access to United States securities dealers in Japanese securities
markets.
6. Economic Relations Hearing, supra note 4, at 65; United States Trade and Competi-
tiveness: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Economic Stabilization of the House Comm. on
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 204-05 (1985) [hereinafter Trade
and Competitiveness Hearing] (statement of Harry L. Freeman, Executive Vice President, The
American Express Company).
7. Macroeconomic theory suggests that whenever a country imports necessary capital it
will have a trade deficit. Likewise, whenever a country exports capital it will run a trade
surplus. Capital from countries with trade surpluses is invested in countries with trade deficits.
This is the current situation involving the United States and Japan. Economic Relations Hear-
ing, supra note 4, at 65, 66.
8. Id. at 66.
9. Id.
10. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, § 3502(a)(2), Pub. L. No. 100-418,
102 Stat. 1107, 1386 (1988) [hereinafter Primary Dealer's Act].
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II. PRINCIPLE AREAS OF UNEQUAL TREATMENT
There are four principle areas in which Japanese securities laws
restrict United States firms from competition in Japanese securities
markets.I Japanese law restricts a United States firm's ability to: (1)
obtain a license to engage in the securities business in Japan;1 2 (2)
obtain membership on a Japanese bond exchange;' 3 (3) compete with
Japanese firms on the basis of commissions; 14 and (4) participate in
the Japanese government bond market.' 5 While these restrictions
have arisen as a result of Japanese culture and tradition, the Japanese
should be encouraged to accept the responsibility that accompanies
their role as a world economic leader and allow competition in Japa-
nese securities markets by granting equal access to United States se-
curities dealers.
A. Entry into Securities Markets
Japanese firms have a much easier time entering United States
securities markets than United States firms entering Japanese securi-
ties markets. While Japanese law discriminates against United States
dealers, the applicable United States laws treat United States and Jap-
anese securities dealers equally.' 6 In fact, the United States has ac-
tively sought foreign investment and has only regulated foreign firms
to the extent necessary to protect United States investors.17
1. Conducting Business in Japanese Securities Markets
The primary Japanese statutes concerning foreign securities deal-
ers, the Foreign Securities Firms Law' a and the Securities and Ex-
change Law,' 9 are modeled after the United States Securities Act of
11. It should be noted that this Comment only analyzes those areas of unequal treatment
set forth in the provisions of the Primary Dealer's Act, supra note 10.
12. Id. § 3502(a)(4)(E), (F).
13. Id. § 3502(a)(4)(A).
14. Id. § 3502(a)(4)(B).
15. Id. § 3502(a)(4)(C).
16. Requests for Comments on Issues Concerning Internationalization of the World Se-
curities Markets, Exchange Act Release No. 21,958, 50 Fed. Reg. 16,302, 16,304 n.30 (1985).
"The United States does not limit access by foreign broker-dealers to its securities markets."
Id.
17. Id.
18. Gaikoku Shjkengysha ni Kansuru Hiritsu (Law on Foreign Securities Firms), Law
No. 5 of 1971 [hereinafter Foreign Securities Firms Law].
19. Shdken Torihiki H6 (Securities and Exchange Law), Law No. 25 of 1948 [hereinafter
Securities and Exchange Law].
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193320 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.21 Though similar,
when combined with other portions of Japanese law they severely
limit a foreign dealer's ability to compete with Japanese firms in Japa-
nese securities markets. The purpose of the Foreign Securities Firms
Law is:
to open the way for foreign firms to engage in securities business
through the establishment of a branch or branches in this country
[Japan], and to contribute to a sound development of the capital
market, as well as the protection of the investors by exercising ap-
propriate control over their business.22
The three methods by which a United States firm can conduct
business in Japan indicate how unsuccessful the Japanese have been in
fulfilling the stated purpose of the Foreign Securities Firms Law. Spe-
cifically, a United States firm is permitted to establish either a liaison,
subsidiary, or branch office in Japan. The differences between these
three methods of doing business are substantial and severely inhibit a
firm's ability to engage in the securities business in Japanese securities
markets.
The function of a liaison office is simply the collection and offer-
ing of information concerning the securities markets. 23 Liaison offices
are not places of business and do not engage in direct profit making
activities. 24 A license to do business is not required.25 A firm seeking
to open a liaison office must merely notify the Minister of Finance of
the company's intent to open such an office. 26 The main benefit of
opening a liaison office is substantially reduced regulation by the Japa-
nese government. 27 However, the opening of a liaison office does not
allow a United States firm direct entry into Japanese securities mar-
kets. The firm cannot transact orders with Japanese investors and
cannot purchase Japanese securities, either for itself or on behalf of
United States investors.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1982).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1982); 5 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, pt. 8, ch. 1, at 6 (Z. Kitagawa
ed. 1988).
22. Foreign Securities Firms Law, supra note 18, art. 1.
23. Z. Kitagawa, supra note 21, pt. 8, ch. 2, at 36.
24. 4 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, pt. 7, ch. 4, at 16 (Z. Kitagawa ed. 1988).
25. Foreign Securities Firms Law, supra note 18, art. 31, para. 1.
26. Id.
27. For example, a liaison office may receive funds from its head office without being
required to obtain a license from the Japanese Government. The firm does not have to submit
a Branch Establishment Report as does a branch office. The office will not even be considered
a place of business for tax purposes. Z. Kitagawa, supra note 24, pt. 7, ch. 4, at 16.
[Vol. 11:549
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On the other hand, there is an indirect benefit to opening a liai-
son office. The primary purpose of opening such an office is to estab-
lish a foothold for the foreign firm in Japan. While the firm is not
allowed to conduct securities transactions, it serves as a base for pro-
motion of the firm's services in its home market.
28
Likewise, a United States firm could not enter Japanese securities
markets by acquiring a Japanese subsidiary. 29 In order to acquire a
Japanese subsidiary the acquiring firm must notify the Minister of Fi-
nance of its intent to acquire shares.30 However, establishment of a
subsidiary office for purposes of entering the securities business is im-
possible because the securities business is classified as a financial busi-
ness under the Antimonopoly Act.31 Under the Antimonopoly Act
those seeking to acquire a firm engaged in a financial business must
obtain approval from the Fair Trade Commission prior to purchasing
more than 5% of the outstanding shares. 32 The Commission will not
grant approval if the acquisition will bring about control of the busi-
ness activities of the acquiree.3 3 Such control would be deemed a sub-
stantial restraint on competition which is prohibited by the Act.
34
Thus, it is difficult for a United States firm to conduct the securities
business in Japan by establishing a subsidiary because control is a ne-
cessity. To date, no Japanese firm has yet been acquired by a United
States firm.
28. Miles, Constraints on Broker-Dealers Operating Outside Their Home Country, 4 J.
COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 260, 262 (1982).
29. A subsidiary is a company which is owned and controlled by another company. Prior
to April 27, 1973, Japan limited foreign acquisition of Japanese domestic companies to 50% or
less of the company's total shares outstanding. However, in 1973 the Japanese liberalized this
policy to allow 100% investment by foreigners. This was an attempt by the Japanese govern-
ment to comply with the Convention on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment, Dec. 14, 1960. Japan's intent in liberalizing the policy was to "promote the
internationalization of world economics and to contribute to world peace and prosperity
through international cooperation in the area of business." Z. Kitagawa, supra note 24, pt. 7,
ch. 2, at 7.
30. Id. The notification must include specific information about the character of the for-
eign investor, the type and amount of stock to be acquired, the objective of such investment,
and time of execution. This notification is presented to the Minister of Finance, by way of the
Bank of Japan, by a Japanese resident who is the acquiring firm's proxy. Id.
31. Shiteki Dokusen no Kinshi Oyobi Kdsei Torihiki no Kakuho ni Kansuro Hdritsu (An-
timonopoly and Fair Trade Maintenance Act), Law No. 38 of 1947, art. 10, para. 2 [hereinaf-
ter Antimonopoly Act]. The purpose of the Act is to promote free and fair competition in the
Japanese economy in order to protect the interests of consumers. Id. art. 1.
32. Id. art. 11. The Fair Trade Commission is responsible for administration and en-
forcement of the Antimonopoly Act. Z. Kitagawa, supra note 21, pt. 9, ch. 1, at 21.
33. Z. Kitagawa, supra note 21, pt. 9, ch. 4, at 7.
34. Id.
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Despite existing barriers, the one possible method of United
States entry into Japanese securities markets is the establishment of a
branch office in Japan. A United States firm desiring to enter into
transactions with a Japanese resident must obtain a license to do busi-
ness35 for each branch, and the firm.3 6 A license is required for each
type of securities business to be conducted. 37 Licenses are granted by
the Ministry of Finance for the following transactions: buying and
selling securities, acting as an intermediary, broker, or agent of per-
sons buying and selling securities, underwriting the distribution of
new securities or secondary offerings, and handling public offerings of
new or outstanding securities.
38
Generally, the licensing requirements for foreign firms are identi-
cal to those for domestic firms. 39 To apply for a license, an applica-
tion is filed pursuant to Ministry of Finance requirements. 4° When
making the decision to grant a license, the Minister of Finance takes
into consideration a number of different factors. 41 The applicant must
have sufficient capitalization to engage in the proposed business and
must be a sound prospect for making a satisfactory profit.42 The firm
35. After World War II and prior to 1953, the Japanese had a registration system much
like the current registration system used in the United States. However, in 1953 the Japanese
replaced the registration system with a licensing system, which had been in place prior to
World War II. JAPANESE SECURITIES REGULATIONS 109 (L. Loss, M. Yazawa & B. Banoff
eds. 1983).
36. Prior to obtaining a license to do business the firm must appoint a Japanese represen-
tative for each branch office which will conduct the securities business. Securities and Ex-
change Law, supra note 19, arts. 3, 4. Next, the foreign company must file a "Report
Concerning the Establishment of a Branch Office by an Exchange Non-Resident." This report
must describe the planned activities of the proposed branch office. Foreign Securities Firms
Law, supra note 18, art. 5(1). These requirements differ in application to Japanese firms in that
Japanese firms are only required to obtain a license for the firm, while foreign firms must
obtain a license for both the firm and each branch. Securities and Exchange Law, supra note
19, art. 2.
37. Foreign Securities Firms Law, supra note 18, art. 3, para. 1.
38. Id. art. 3, para. 3.
39. Id. Cf. Securities and Exchange Law, supra note 19.
40. Foreign Securities Firms Law, supra note 18, art. 4.
41. Id. art. 5. Cf Securities and Exchange Law, supra note 19, art. 31.
42. Foreign Securities Firms Law, supra note 18, art. 5. The amount of capitalization
varies with the type of business to be conducted. Those wishing to engage in the underwriting
business must have capital as follows: managing underwriter currently engaging in securities
business - Y3 billion; managing underwriter engaging exclusively in underwriting business -
Y 1 billion; non-managing underwriter engaging exclusively in underwriting business - ¥200
million. Broker-dealer licenses require capitalization as follows: regular member of the Tokyo
or Osaka exchange - Y 100 million; regular member of Nagoya exchange - V50 million; regu-
lar member of other exchanges - Y30 million; non-member who deals exclusively with securi-
ties companies and is located in a district outside Tokyo or Osaka - Y20 million; firm which
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must also have sufficient knowledge and experience to adequately
carry out the securities business.43 Finally, the proposed business
must be necessary and appropriate in light of the number of securities
transactions, the number of securities companies, and the number of
total securities offices in existence. 44
In addition, the foreign firm must deposit a performance bond
for each of its branches at an official depository located near each
branch.45 The purpose of this bond is to insure a "direct and ultimate
guarantee of the payment capacity of foreign securities companies in
Japan' 46 and to protect investors. 47 The amount to be deposited de-
pends on the type of license, the mode of business, and the location of
the branch.
48
Both domestic and non-domestic firms are denied licenses for a
number of reasons. 49 If the capital of the company is inadequate a
license will be denied.5 0 A foreign firm's application will also be de-
nied if the applicant is not a legal person of the same type as a Japa-
nese stock company, has not engaged continuously for more than
three years in the business of the same kind as that for which the
license is sought, has illegally participated in the securities business,
has been convicted for violation of any securities laws within the prior
five years, or has had the securities license issued by his home country
cancelled. 51 A license may also be denied if the applicant, or any of-
ficer or representative of the applicant, has been bankrupt, has been
convicted of a securities law violation within the prior five years, has
worked for a firm whose domestic license has been cancelled within
thirty days prior to the applicant's termination of employment, or has
deals exclusively with securities companies and has offices in Tokyo or Osaka - Y4 million;
firm that deals exclusively with securities companies and has offices outside of Tokyo or Osaka
districts - Y I million. Distributors do not have to meet any capital requirements. Z. Kita-
gawa, supra note 21, pt. 8, ch. 2, at 6-7.
43. Securities and Exchange Law, supra note 19, art. 31(2).
44. Id. art. 31(3).
45. Foreign Securities Firms Law, supra note 18, art. 8, para. 1.
46. Z. Kitagawa, supra note 21, pt. 8, ch. 2, at 23.
47. Id.
48. Id. Generally, the amount to be deposited must be equivalent to one-tenth of the
minimum stated capital required for that specific type of securities business. See supra note 42.
If that amount is less than Y 10 million, the amount deposited must be equal to V 10 million.
Foreign Securities Firms Law, supra note 18, art. 8, para. 1.
49. Foreign Securities Firms Law, supra note 18, art. 6. Cf. Securities and Exchange
Law, supra note 19, art. 32.
50. See supra note 42.
51. Foreign Securities Firms Law, supra note 18, art. 6. Cf. Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 15(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4) (1982).
1989]
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been removed from his position under domestic securities laws. 52
In addition to obtaining a license, a foreign firm must register
directors and employees who engage in the securities business, or re-
lated nonsecurities business, with the Ministry of Finance. 53 Those
individuals who are not registered are prohibited from engaging in the
securities business.
54
However, the entire licensing process is frustrated by the exist-
ence of a system known as "administrative guidance." Administra-
tive guidance is a term which characterizes
the action of administrative organs, in respect to matters within a
certain administrative field, in executing statutes by applying them,
and in ordering strong measures against, and otherwise compel-
ling, specific individuals, juristic persons and associations; where
there is voluntary compliance and a statutory basis of action, in
guiding, suggesting, and advising; and where there is voluntary
compliance but no statutory basis of action, in influencing the par-
ties' voluntary cooperation and consensual performance by expres-
sing, as an administrative organ, the expectation and wish that
something should exist or be done in a certain way. 55
In essence, administrative guidance is a means by which cooperation
facilitates the expedition of a firm's application. 56 For example, a for-
eign firm seeking a license must fully cooperate with the Ministry of
Finance or else its application will be denied."7 Compliance is volun-
tary only in the sense that the party complies because of nonlegal in-
centives, such as threat of delay or denial, available to the
administrative body.
58
52. Foreign Securities Firms Law, supra note 18, art. 6(7).
53. Securities and Exchange Law, supra note 19, art. 62, para. 1. These individuals are
defined as registered representatives. Id.
54. Securities and Exchange Law, supra note 19, art 62, para. 2.
55. Narita, Administrative Guidance, 2 LAW IN JAPAN 45, 45-46 (1968). For a more
detailed discussion of the definition of administrative guidance, see Yeomans, Administrative
Guidance: A Peregrine View, 19 LAW IN JAPAN 125 (1986).
56. See Narita, supra note 55, at 52. The principle of "administrative guidance" devel-
oped in the post war era under the National Authority. In this postwar period it was found
that formal authority was insufficient to deal with the many problems brought about by recon-
struction, so Japan's administrative authorities gained unlimited power in areas not restricted
by law. Id. at 49-50.
57. For examples of the applications of administrative guidance, see Smith, The Japanese
Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law and Administrative Guidance: The Labrynth
and the Castle, 16 LAW & POLICY INT'L Bus. 417 (1984).
58. Id. at 420.
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1989] Equal Access in Japan 557
2. Registration in the United States as a Broker or Dealer
5 9
Entering the securities business in the United States is simpler
than in Japan. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires that any
person who uses the mails or instrumentalities of interstate commerce
to effect transactions of securities register as a broker or dealer.
60
This requirement is applicable to both domestic and foreign dealers. 6'
The registration process entails filing an application for registration
with the Securities and Exchange Commission. 62 A broker-dealer re-
gistration will not be granted if standards of operational capability are
not met, and if the broker-dealer, or associated persons, does not meet
standards of training, experience, and competence necessary for the
59. This Comment only discusses the registration of broker-dealers in general. The
Government Securities Act of 1986 provides specific requirements for broker-dealers involved
with the government securities market. For a discussion of the Government Securities Act, see
Comment, The Government Securities Act of 1986: Balancing Investor Protection with Market
Liquidity, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 999 (1987).
60. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(a)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1) (1982). The Ex-
change Act defines broker as "any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in
securities for the account of others .... " Id. § 3(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4). The Act defines a
dealer as "any person engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for his own
account .... " Id. § 3(17), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5). For a detailed discussion of broker-dealer
registration, see Lipton, A Primer on Broker-Dealer Registration, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 899
(1987).
61. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(17), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(17) (1982). The Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission does allow foreign broker-dealers to transact with foreign na-
tionals outside of the United States without being registered as a broker or dealer. The
Commission, interpreting section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act, indicates that if a foreign
broker-dealer either sells securities into the United States or purchases securities in the United
States for United States nationals abroad they must be a registered broker-dealer. Registration
of Underwriters of Foreign Offerings as Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 7366, 33
Fed. Reg. 9828 (July 21, 1964). Foreign dealers must register if they intend to make sales to
United States nationals, wherever such nationals may be. The United States broker-dealer
standards only differ in application to non-domestic firms in that such firms must consent to
service of process. Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 15b1-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15bl-5
(1988). See also Registration Requirements for Foreign Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 25,801, 53 Fed. Reg. 23,645 (June 23, 1988).
62. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(1) (1982). Applica-
tion for registration as a broker-dealer is to be made on Securities and Exchange Commission
Form BD. Securities Exchange Commission Rule 15bl-l, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15bl-1 (1988). In
addition, the Commission requires the applicant to file a statement of financial condition
within thirty days of filing. Such statement must be detailed enough to disclose the nature and
amount of the applicant's assets, liabilities, and net worth. The statement must also reflect the
applicant's aggregate indebtedness, net capital, and include a list of securities in which the
applicant has an interest. Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 15bl-2(a-c), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15bl-2(a-c) (1988). The applicant must also file a statement describing the broker-
dealer's capital and stating that such capital will be maintained, and that the broker-dealer has
and will continue to have adequate facilities and financing required for the carrying out of the
securities business. Id. 15bl-2(c), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15bl-2(c).
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protection of investors.63 In addition, the applicant must not be sub-
ject to any statutory disqualification. 64
Within forty-five days of filing, the Commission is required to
either grant registration or institute proceedings to determine if the
registration should be denied.65 If proceedings for denial are insti-
tuted the Commission must provide the applicant with notice of the
reasons for denial and must give the applicant an opportunity for a
hearing within 120 days of the date of filing the application.
66
If registration is granted, the Commission must make an inspec-
tion of the broker-dealer within six months to determine whether the
broker-dealer conforms with provisions of the Securities Exchange
Act and the Commission's rules and regulations.67 At that time, if the
Commission finds any violations which constitute grounds for suspen-
sion or revocation, 6 the Commission may censure, place limitations
upon, suspend, or revoke the license of the broker-dealer as necessary
in the public interest.69 However, before the Commission revokes a
broker-dealer registration, it must provide the broker-dealer with no-
tice and an opportunity for a hearing. 7
0
At the conclusion of proceedings for denial, or after the six
month inspection, the Commission may grant or deny registration if
the requirements for approval still have not been met or if it finds that
if the applicant were registered its registration would be subject to
suspension or revocation. 7'
63. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(b)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(7) (1982).
64. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(1) (1982).
65. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(b)(1)(A-B), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(1)(A-B) (1982).
66. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(b)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(1)(B) (1982).
However, the 120 day period may be extended up to an additional ninety days if the Commis-
sion finds good cause for such an extension and publishes its reasons for doing so. Id.
67. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(b)(2)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(2)(C) (1982).
68. See infra note 77.
69. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(b)4, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4) (1982).
70. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(l)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(1)(B) (1982).
71. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(b)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(1) (1982). Grounds
for suspension or revocation require that it be in the public interest and that the broker or
dealer, either before or after becoming a broker or dealer, has made false or misleading state-
ments to the Commission, has been convicted within the ten years preceding the filing for
impropriety involving securities or crimes of dishonesty, has been ordered by a court to cease
any business involving securities transactions, has violated provisions of the securities laws, or
has aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, or procured the violation of any provi-
sions of securities laws. Id. § 15(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4).
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3. Unequal Treatment
The Japanese do not grant equal access to United States firms
opening securities businesses in Japan. The Japanese do not allow a
United States firm to acquire a Japanese firm. The Japanese only al-
low United States firms to conduct business after obtaining a license.
The licensing process is far more complex than the United States bro-
ker-dealer registration process. The Japanese require a United States
firm to put up a performance bond and register each employee. In
addition, Japanese law does not delineate specific periods of time in
which the Ministry of Finance is to grant or deny an application for a
license. More importantly, Japanese law does not provide an oppor-
tunity for a hearing upon denial of an application for a license.
The United States, on the other hand, does not prohibit Japanese
firms from opening securities offices in the United States nor does it
prohibit the Japanese from acquiring existing United States firms.
The United States merely requires that a Japanese firm file an applica-
tion for broker-dealer registration. The United States does not re-
quire the deposit of a performance bond nor registration of each
employee. The effect of such inequalities is that Japanese firms can
easily enter the securities business in the United States while United
States firms must navigate a long and complex channel of Japanese
rules, regulations, unwritten standards, and cultural barriers.
B. Securities Exchange Membership
Membership on a securities exchange is important because it al-
lows a firm to buy and sell securities directly on a securities exchange.
Only members of an exchange are allowed to trade on the exchange.
Those firms that are not members of an exchange must have their
transactions executed by members of the exchange. Members charge
non-members a commission for making a transaction. By being a
member of an exchange, the firm can eliminate the expense of having
to route transactions through an exchange member.
1. Membership on a Japanese Stock Exchange
Membership on a Japanese stock exchange is limited only to se-
curities corporations. 72 Each stock exchange is controlled and man-
aged by the members of the Exchange who have the supreme decision
72. Securities and Exchange Law, supra note 19, art. 90. In the United States, member-
ship is allowed to both corporations and inviduals.
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making authority.73 These members also grant membership to foreign
firms. Membership in the Japanese Securities Dealers Association is
not required but suggested because of the important role of the
Association. 74
2. Membership on a United States Stock Exchange
In general, each United States securities exchange enacts and im-
plements its own rules regarding membership, subject, of course, to
oversight by the Securities and Exchange Commission.75 However,
the Securities Exchange Act states that the national exchange to
which an applicant is applying must deny membership if the applicant
is not a registered broker-dealer, or if a natural person, is not associ-
ated with a registered broker-dealer.76 Membership may, or if
deemed by the Commission to be necessary and appropriate in the
public interest, must, be denied if the applicant is subject to a statu-
tory disqualification. 77 In addition, the exchange may deny or condi-
tion membership upon satisfying standards of financial responsibility
or operational capability. The application may be denied if the bro-
ker-dealer or a person associated with them has engaged in, or there is
a reasonable likelihood that that person has engaged in, or may in the
future engage in, practices or acts inconsistent with just and equitable
principles of trade, or if the applicant does not meet minimum stan-
dards of training, experience, and competence, refuses to supply the
exchange with information regarding its dealings with the exchange,
or refuses to permit examination of its books and records for purposes
of verifying their accuracy.78 The exchange may also deny member-
ship in order to limit the number of members of the exchange. 79
Once the firm has been approved as a broker-dealer it must be-
come a member of a securities association registered pursuant to the
73. Z. Kitagawa, supra note 21, pt. 8, ch. 3, at 17.
74. L. Loss, supra note 35, at 79.
75. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1982).
76. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 6(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(c)(1) (1982).
77. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 6(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(2) (1982). An applicant is
subject to a statutory disqualification if the applicant has been and is expelled or suspended
from membership or participation in any trading market, is subject to a regulatory agency
order suspending or revoking the applicant's registration, has been found to be the cause of any
effective suspension, has associated with any person known to be statutorily disqualified, has
been convicted of any wilful violation or aided and abetted a violation of any of the securities
acts, or has been convicted within the ten years preceding the filing of application of any felony
or misdemeanor relating to the securities markets. Id. § 3(39), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(39).
78. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 6(c)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(c)(3) (1982).
79. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 6(c)(4)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(c)(4)(A) (1982).
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Securities Exchange Act. 0 This means the firm must apply to the
only securities association registered pursuant to section 15(b)(8) of
the Securities Exchange Act, the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD).8 1
3. Unequal Treatment
United States firms have experienced difficulty in obtaining seats
on Japanese securities exchanges because there are no enunciated
standards by which a United States firm can obtain membership. Tra-
ditionally, members of a Japanese securities exchange have been a
close knit group who are wary of granting membership to outsiders.
Futher, members would rather have United States firms route their
transactions through existing Japanese brokers.
The first foreign firms were allowed membership on the Tokyo
Stock exchange in 1985.82 To date, only a few foreign firms have been
granted membership on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Japanese officials
have claimed that they have not alowed more foreigners exchange
membership because of a lack of space at the exchange and efforts to
computerize the trading floor.
8 3
On the other hand, the United States has very detailed rules
which allow exchange membership, for both domestic and foreign
firms, so long as the firm complies with broker-dealer registration re-
quirements.8 4 As a result, foreign firms have been allowed member-
ship on the New York Stock Exchange, regional exchanges, as well as
in the National Association of Securities Dealers.
85
80. Securities Exchange Act, § 15(b)(8), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(b)(8) (West Supp. 1988).
However, the firm is not required to become a member of a securities association if it is a
member of a national securities exchange, carries no customer accounts, and has annual gross
income from securities transactions less than or equal to $1,000. Securities and Exchange
Commission Rule 15b9-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b9-1 (1988).
81. The application procedure is quite simple. The applicant must merely apply to the
Association and accept and agree to Association rules, pay dues, not hold the Association
liable, and to provide the Association with required information. NASD Bylaws, NASD Man-
ual (CCH), art. III, para. 1131, § l(a) (1988).
82. Britain Seeks More Seats for Its Firms On Tokyo Stock Exchange, Mulls Sanctions,
Wall St. J., Apr. 7, 1987, at 31.
83. Id.
84. Williams & Spencer, Regulation of International Securities Markets: Towards A
Greater Cooperation, 4 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. LIT. 279, 282 (1982). See also Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, § 6(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(c)(1) (1982).
85. Williams & Spencer, supra note 84, at 282; Pozen, Disclosure and Trading in an Inter-
national Securities Market, 15 INT'L LAW 84, 90 (1981).
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C. Brokerage Commissions
The commission structure is of significant importance in the
competitive workings of any securities market. In those markets
where variable commissions are allowed, brokers can attract clients
by lowering their commission rates. However, in markets that have a
fixed rate structure, all brokers must charge the fixed rate, thus elimi-
nating the opportunity to attract clients on the basis of commission
rates.
1. Japan's Fixed Brokerage Commissions
In Japan, securities exchanges are required to fix commission
rates 6 and exchange members are required to charge their customers
the fixed rate.8 7 For example, the Tokyo Stock Exchange has both a
fixed brokerage charge plus a sliding scale fee. 88 These fixed rates are
the highest in the world and range from 1.25% for transactions under
Y 10 million to 0.15 % for transactions over Y 1 billion.8 9
2. United States Negotiated Commission Rates
United States stock exchanges may not directly or indirectly re-
quire members to charge fixed commission rates 90 This is a result of
the long history of the fixing of commissions by securities ex-
changes.91 In Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange,92 the United
86. Commissions are the amount which securities brokers charge clients for executing
orders. The policy of fixing commissions presents no antitrust problems under Japanese law
because securities exchanges are exempt from application of the Antimonopoly Act. 10A IN-
TERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION § 11.04[3] (H. Bloomen-
thai ed. 1986).
87. Securities and Exchange Law, supra note 19, art. 191. These rates are indirectly fixed
by the Minister of Finance. The exchange sets the fixed price in its entrustment contract
regulations. Under the Securities Exchange Law, a securities exchange is required to have a
constitution, business regulations, and entrustment contract regulations which cannot be
amended without the approval of the Minister of Finance. The Minister of Finance may order
the exchange to amend such provisions. Securities and Exchange Law, supra note 19, arts. 82,
para. 2, 85-1, para. 1, and 156. See also INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURI-
TIES REGULATIONS, supra note 86, § 11.02[2][a].
88. Chop Chop, ECONOMIST, June 20, 1987, at 81, 82. In Japan the average investor pays
between 1.25-0.15% in commissions while in London commissions for institutional investors
are between 0.34-0.22% and on Wall Street of 0.6-0.3%. Id.
89. Id.
90. Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 19b-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-3 (1988).
91. For a discussion of the history of commission fixing in United States securities mar-
kets, see Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, 422 U.S. 659 (1975). See also 40 Fed. Reg.
7394 (1975).
92. 422 U.S. 659.
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States Supreme Court affirmed the power of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission to regulate a securities exchange's rate fixing
practices for the protection of investors. Just prior to the decision in
Gordon, the Securities and Exchange Commission found,
it is necessary and appropriate (1) for the protection of investors,
(2) to insure fair dealing in securities traded upon national securi-
ties exchanges, and (3) to insure the fair administration of such
exchanges, that the rules and practices of such exchanges that re-
quire, or have the effect of requiring, exchange members to charge
any persons fixed minimum rates of commission, should be
eliminated.
93
Gordon and the Commission findings resulted in Securities and Ex-
change Commission Rule 19b-3 94 which facilitated competition
among brokers by elimination of fixed commissions. Brokers desiring
to attract new clients merely reduce their commission rates thereby
reducing the cost to their clients.
3. Unequal Treatment
The disparity between the two countries commission rate systems
is substantial. When Japanese firms do business in the United States,
they are free to compete for United States investors on the basis of
commissions. If Japanese firms want to lower their commission rates
below those of United States firms to attract United States investors
they may do so. When United States firms engage in the securities
business in Japan they are forced to charge the fixed rate required by
the exchange. As a result, United States firms cannot compete in Jap-
anese securities markets for Japanese investors by offering lower
commissions.
D. The Government Securities Markets
1. The Japanese Government Bond Market
In Japan, as in the United States, the issuance of government
debt securities finances the national debt. There are three types of
Japanese government debt securities available: short, medium, and
long term issues.95 An auction system currently exists for the sale of
93. Id. at 674-75.
94. 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-3 (1988).
95. The Japanese do not have government issues beyond the maturity of twenty years
because of the size of the national deficit. Short term government issues mature after six
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both short and medium term issues.96 However, the Ministry of Fi-
nance requires that those who wish to participate in the auction be
members of the government securities underwriting syndicate, and
hold an account with the Bank of Japan. 97
Long term Japanese government debt is currently sold to a syndi-
cate controlled by Japanese institutions. 98 The Japanese bond syndi-
cate is similar to a syndicate formed for the issuance of stock in that
syndicate members bear the risk for any unsold portions of the issu-
ance. 99 However, there is substantial interference by the Japanese
government.1°° For example, the Japanese Ministry of Finance more
or less dictates the terms of the debt issuance by negotiating the offer-
ing price with the underwriting syndicate prior to the issuance. 01
2. The United States Government Securities Market
Buying and selling United States government securities assists
the Department of the Treasury in financing government debt, and
provides the Federal Reserve with a means of implementing monetary
policy. 102 The Treasury issues government securities to primary deal-
ers through an auction system. 03 These issues are sold in both pri-
mary and secondary markets. Primary dealers are those dealers that
buy and sell government securities directly with the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York. 1°4 These primary dealers in turn offer govern-
months. Medium term government issues mature after 2, 3, 4, or 5 years. Long term govern-
ment issues mature after ten or twenty years
96. Sharing the Government Bond Pie: A Fair Slice of the Pie Depends on the Point of
View, EUROMONEY, Mar. 1987, at 126, 128. See Houses Find Treasury Bond System Archaic,
SUPPLEMENT TO EUROMONEY, Apr. 1987, at 85, 85 [hereinafter Special Supplement].
97. Sharing the Government Bond Pie, supra note 96, at 128.
98. Japanese Plan Auction Sales of Some Bonds, Wall St. J., May 12, 1987, at 29, col. 1.
Japan's long term government debt securities include five-year discount bonds, ten-year bonds,
and twenty-year bonds. Special Supplement, supra note 96, at 85. This syndicate is currently
comprised of 800 members. Japan Will Use Price Auction System To Sell 40 Percent of New
JO-Year Bonds, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1401 (Sept. 16, 1988).
99. See Japanese Bond Plan Disappoints Firms, N.Y. Times, June 6, 1987, at 39, col. 6.
100. See Special Supplement, supra note 96, at 85.
101. Id.
102. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND, INSTRUMENTS OF THE MONEY MARKET
30 (1981).
103. Id.
104. BROKER-DEALERS 1985: REGULATIONS AND LITIGATION, PRACTISING LAW INSTI-
TUTE 97 (1985) [hereinafter BROKER-DEALERS]. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York is
primarily responsible for conducting the Federal Reserve's open market operations. Open
market operations are the tool used by the Federal Reserve, as the nation's central bank, to
influence the costs and availability of money and credit. Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
Fedpoints 2: Primary Dealers Defined (Feb. 1988).
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ment securities to secondary dealers. 0 5
In December 1985, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York ini-
tially outlined the standards and procedures to be used to determine
whether a firm should be designated as a primary dealer. 0 6 A firm
seeking primary dealer status is expected to fulfill a number of re-
quirements: to make markets in the full range of Treasury issues for a
reasonably diverse group of customers, 0 7 participate meaningfully in
Treasury auctions,10 8 evidence management depth and experience,
good internal controls and committment to continue participation as
a market-maker over the long term, must have sufficient capital to
support their activities, and manage their risk exposure prudently
within the bounds of their capital.1°9
The firm desiring to become a primary dealer does not have to
make a formal application for primary dealer status, but rather needs
only file an informal declaration of its intent to become a primary
dealer."10 Thereafter, the firm begins to submit daily, weekly, and
monthly reports on its market positions, financial performance, and
volume of customer business." I1 Once reporting commences, the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank reviews the reports until a time at which it feels it
is appropriate to grant primary dealer status."
2
The Federal Reserve recently revised these guidelines in Novem-
ber of 1988.' 3 It strenghtened the existing guidelines by increasing
the minimum capital level for dealers from $25 million to $50 million
and increased the dealer's minimum required trading volume from
.75% to 1.0%.' '4 In addition, the Federal Reserve stated it would not
designate nor continue to designate, after August 1989, foreign firms
105. BROKER-DEALERS, supra note 104, at 98. Secondary dealers are those dealers that
trade government securities with primary dealers and general investors.
106. Dealer Surveillance Staff, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Primary Dealers: Cri-
teria and Process for Firms Interested in Becoming Primary Dealers (Dec. 1985).
107. Id. at 1. The minimum amount of trading volume required to be traded with custom-
ers is to be about .75%. Id.
108. The primary dealer is expected to submit auction bids of a size commensurate with
that dealer's capacity in a realistic price range relative to market conditions. Id. at 2.
109. Id. at 1.
110. Id. at 3.
111. Id. at 3-5.
112. It is an unwrittern rule of the Federal Reserve that if a firm has been reporting for
more than a year it will be dropped from the list of those being seriously considered for pri-
mary dealer status. New York Fed Adds Three Primary Dealers To List, But Passes Over Japa-
nese House, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1066 (July 8, 1988).
113. New York Fed Adopts Stricter Standards for Gaining Primary Dealer Designation, 20
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1793 (Nov. 25, 1988).
114. Id.
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as primary dealers until it had determined that the firm's home coun-
try granted United States firms the same competitive opportunities as
the United States does to the home country's domestic firms.115
There are currently forty-six primary dealers in the United States
government securities market, fifteen of which are foreign firms.
1 16
These foreign firms account for 15% of the overall bond allocation. 117
3. Unequal Treatment
The overall inequality regarding participation in the United
States and Japanese government securities markets is due to the fact
that both markets are so different.118
In Japan, the syndicate is similar to a United States securities
underwriting syndicate. The syndicate underwriters and members
dictate who will participate in the offering, as well as what percentage
of the debt offering specific members will obtain. The price of each
offering is negotiated between the syndicate and the Ministry of
Finance.
In the United States, on the other hand, the sale of government
securities is conducted through a governmental entity, the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York. The Bank, and not the primary dealers,
is the one that determines with whom it will deal. The allocation of
United States government securities is determined through an auction
system. The price is also determined through this system. The pri-
mary dealers with the highest bids in the auction are the ones who
obtain the largest amount of the offering.
In both systems the criteria for becoming a primary dealer or
syndicate member are not specifically delineated. In Japan, syndicate
members have not specifically delineated what is required for syndi-
cate membership. In the United States, the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York's standards for primary dealer status are merely guidelines.
Members who meet the Federal Reserve's standards still may not be
granted primary dealer status even though they are qualified.
Despite the Federal Reserve guidelines, Japanese firms have re-
115. Id.
116. Federal Reserve Names Japanese Securities Company As Primary Dealer, 20 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) 1521 (Oct. 7, 1988). Of the fifteen non-United States firms that have been
designated as primary dealers, seven are Japanese, five British, and one each from Canada,
Australia, and Hong Kong. Id.
117. Supra note 96.
118. Trade Bill Conferees Agree on Limits For Foreign Dealers in United States Securities,
Wall St. J., Mar. 31, 1988, at 3, col. 4.
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ceived access to the United States government securities market while
United States firms participating in the Japanese government bond
market are restricted from access. For example, in 1986 the Japanese
trading syndicate successfully excluded United States banks and se-
curities dealers from participation in government bond offerings.
Eleven United States firms were allocated only .77% of all such in-
struments distributed. 19 These eleven firms were included in a group
of twenty-five foreign banks and seventeen foreign securities compa-
nies which shared 1% of the total offering. 120 Most United States
firms believe the system to be unfair and are urging that an auction
system, much like the one used in the United States, and Japanese
short and medium term markets, be implemented. 121 The Ministry of
Finance is reluctant to issue long term government debt in such a
manner due to the possibility that such auctions may cost more.122
Japanese commercial banks and insurance companies, who are allo-
cated 76% of the offering from the syndicate, fear losing much of
their business in such auctions. 123 On the other hand, United States
firms feel that an auction system would actually reduce the cost of
borrowing. 124 In reality, the Japanese concern is that the auction may
not sell an entire issue of new debt. 125 After all, a good percentage of
the issue is used to refinance redemptions of expiring bonds. 126
III. THE UNITED STATES ATTEMPT TO ELIMINATE
RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES
A. Primary Dealers Act of 1988
The United States has attempted to unilaterally force Japan to
eliminate restrictions upon foreign securities dealers through enact-
ment of the Primary Dealers Act of 1988.127 The Act specifically at-
119. Japanese Plan Auction Sales of Some Bonds, supra note 98, at 29.
120. Sharing the Government Bond Pie, supra note 96, at 127.
121. See Special Supplement, supra note 96, at 87.
122. Sharing the Government Bond Pie, supra note 96, at 127.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 131.
125. Foreign Firms Not Unhappy With Their Share of Japanese Gov't Bond Market, 18 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1750 (Dec. 5, 1986).
126. Id. at 128.
127. Supra note 10, §§ 3501, 3502 (1987). This was not the first attempt at eliminating
Japanese restrictions upon United States securities dealers. The Primary Dealer's Act had
previously been introduced in a number of different forms. See H.R. 4848, 100th Cong., 2nd
Sess. §§ 3501, 3502 (1988); H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3501, 3502 (1987); S. 1409, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 601, 602 (1987); S. 1101, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 1463, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H. Con. Res. 403, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1986). The text of each
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tempts to eliminate Japanese discrimination against United States
firms. 128 It prohibits the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
system and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York from designating,
or continuing to designate, a foreign person as a primary dealer in
United States government debt instruments if that person's home
country does not allow United States firms equal access to that coun-
try's government debt markets. 129 The Act is based upon findings
that United States companies can successfully compete in foreign
markets, a trade surplus in services could help lower the overall trade
deficit between the United States and Japan, United States firms have
been excluded from Japanese debt offerings, and Japanese firms face
version was virtually the same. However, S. 1409 and S. 1101 additionally provided for equal
treatment of United States banks and bank holding companies. See S. 1409, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess § 601 (1987); S. 1101, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1987).
128. S. Rep. No. 85, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1987).
129. Primary Dealer's Act, supra note 10, § 3502.
SEC. 3502. REQUIREMENT OF NATIONAL TREATMENT IN UN-
DERWRITING GOVERNMENT DEBT INSTRUMENTS.
(a) FINDINGs.-The Congress finds that-
(1) United States companies can successfully compete in foreign markets
if they are given fair access to such markets;
(2) a trade surplus in services could offset the deficit in manufactured
goods and help lower the overall trade deficit significantly;
(3) in contrast to the barriers faced by United States firms in Japan, Japa-
nese firms generally have enjoyed access to United States financial markets on the
same terms as United States firms; and
(4) United States firms seeking to compete in Japan face a variety of dis-
criminatory barriers effectively precluding such firms from fairly competing for Japa-
nese business, including-
(A) limitations on membership on the Tokyo Stock Exchange;
(B) high fixed commission rates (ranging as high as 80 percent)
which must be paid to members of the exchange by nonmembers for executing
trades;
(C) unequal opportunities to participate in and act as lead manager
for equity and bond underwritings;
(D) restrictions on access to automated teller machines;
(E) arbitrarily applied employment requirements for opening
branch offices;
(F) long delays in processing applications and granting approvals
for licenses to operate; and
(G) restrictions on foreign institutions' participation in Ministry of
Finance advisory councils.
(b) DESIGNATION OF CERTAIN PERSONS AS PRIMARY DEALERS PROHIB-
ITED.-
(1) GENERAL RULE.-Neither the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System nor the Federal Reserve Bank of New York may designate, or permit
the continuation of any prior designation of, any person of a foreign country as a
primary dealer in government debt instruments if such foreign country does not ac-
cord to United States companies the same competitive opportunities in the under-
writing and distribution of government debt instruments issued by such country as
such country accords to domestic companies of such country.
(2) CERTAIN PRIOR ACQUISITIONS EXCEPTED.-Paragraph (1) shall not
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few barriers in accessing United States markets.130 More importantly,
however, the Act recognizes that United States firms face discrimina-
tory barriers to Japanese securities markets.131 These barriers include
long delays in processing applications and granting approvals for
licenses to operate, arbitrarily applied employment requirements for
opening branch offices, limitations on membership on the Tokyo
Stock Exchange, and high fixed commission rates.
132
The underlying purpose of the Act is to force the Japanese to
open their securities markets or else risk closure of United States mar-
kets to Japanese dealers. Thus, the Act operates to unilaterally coerce
reciprocity.133 When enforced, the Act requires that the Federal Re-
serve Bank of New York not designate, nor continue to designate,
Japanese firms as primary dealers in the United States government
debt markets unless Japan grants equal access to United States firms.
Those Japanese firms not designated as primary dealers would pres-
sure the Japanese government to eliminate restrictions imposed on
United States firms in Japanese securities markets.
apply to the continuation of the prior designation of a company as a primary dealer
in government debt instruments if-
(A) such designation occurred before July 31, 1987; and
(B) before July 31, 1987-
(i) control of such company was acquired from a person (other
than a person of a foreign country) by a person of a foreign country; or
(ii) in conjunction with a person of a foreign country, such
company informed the Federal Reserve Bank of New York of the intention of such
person to acquire control of such company.
(c) EXCEPTION FOR COUNTRIES HAVING OR NEGOTIATING BILATERAL
AGREEMENTS WITH THE UNITED STATES.-Subsection (b) shall not apply to any
person of a foreign country if-
(1) that country, as of January 1, 1987, was negotiating a bilateral agree-
ment with the United States under the authority of section 102(b)(4)(A) of the Trade
Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2112(b)(4)(A)); or
(2) that country has a bilateral free trade area agreement with the United
States which entered into force before January 1, 1987.
(d) PERSON OF A FOREIGN COUNTRY DEFINED.-For purposes of this sec-
tion, a person is a "person of a foreign country" if that person, or any other person
which directly or indirectly owns or controls that person, is a resident of that coun-
try, is organized under the laws of that country, or has its principal place of business
in that country.
(e) EFFECTIVE DATE.-This section shall take effect 12 months after the date
of the enactment of this Act.
Id.
130. Primary Dealer's Act, supra note 10, at § 3502 (a)(1-4).
131. Id. § 3502 (a)(5)(A-D).
132. Id.
133. Reciprocity traditionally has been described as a relationship between two states in
which each state gives the subjects of the other certain privileges in return for similar
privileges.
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B. Effectiveness of The Primary Dealers Act
The effectiveness of the Act is questionable. 134 While its purpose
is to pressure the Japanese to allow United States dealers equal access
to the Japanese goverment bond market, it will not do so for a number
of reasons.
First, the Primary Dealer's Act is contrary to current United
States policy regarding international regulation of securities markets.
The United States currently favors bilateral negotiation to unilateral
action. In the past the United States has unsuccessfully attempted to
enforce unilateral application of its securities laws to foreign per-
sons.' 35 The primary attempt was embodied in the "waiver by con-
duct" approach.' 36 The "waiver by conduct" approach required
foreign investors who traded in United States markets to waive the
protections otherwise afforded by secrecy laws and blocking statutes
of other countries as a precondition to trading. 137 If the foreign inves-
tor did not waive such protections, they would be prevented from
trading in United States markets. 38  From the outset, the proposed
approach was highly controversial. 39  The Reagan administration
and the Treasury Department were opposed to the approach on
grounds that it would "run counter to the administration's goals of
encouraging the free flow of capital across borders, enhancing interna-
tional economic cooperation, and reducing unnecessary restraints on
foreign and international financial and banking activities."'1'4 The
134. It should be noted, however, that immediately after the Primary Dealer's Act became
law, the Japanese Ministry of Finance announced that 40% of the 10 year bond market would
be auctioned rather than sold through a syndicate. These auctions are scheduled to commence
in April of 1989. 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1521 (Oct. 7, 1988). Also, the Ministry of
Finance agreed to increase the foreign share of bonds allocated through the underwriting syn-
dicate from 2.5% to 8%. 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1401, 1402 (Nov. 16, 1988). The
Ministry also stated that four foreign firms would be allowed to become co-managers of the
syndicate responsible for fixing allocations. Id. In addition, those syndicate members with less
than a .3 percent share of the underwriting syndicate would be allowed to buy their bonds
through a noncompetitive tender. Id.
135. See Haseltine, International Regulation of Securities Markets: Interaction Between the
United States and Foreign Laws, 36 INT'L & COMp. L. Q. 307, 308 (1987); Note, Enforcing
Securities Regulations Through Bilateral Agreements with the United Kingdom and Japan: An
Interim Measure or a Solution, 23 TEX. INT'L L. J. 251, 263-64 (1988). For a discussion of the
"waiver by conduct" approach, see The SEC Goes International, N.Y.L.J., June 20, 1985, at 1,
col. 1.
136. Haseltine, supra note 135, at 309.
137. Id. at 310.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 311.
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most important of the reasons is that this unilateral approach would
complicate efforts aimed at international cooperation.1 4 1 As a result
of such concerns the unilateral approach was replaced by a more pro-
ductive system comprised of bilateral negotiation.
142
Second, reduction of Japanese participation in the primary dealer
market would be detrimental to the United States economy. The sale
of United States Treasury issues is primarily used to finance the enor-
mous United States debt. Exclusion of the Japanese would reduce the
overall demand for United States government securities. 4
3
The ultimate effect would be a reduction in the quantity of bonds
sold, a lower price paid for such securities, as well as a rise in interest
rates. " In effect, the Act is anti-competitive because it reduces com-
petition in the government securities market.
Such a reduction in proceeds derived from the bond issues could
have a detrimental effect on the United States' ability to repay interest
on the debt. For example, in a six month period Japanese investors
purchased about $667.4 billion worth of United States government
bonds. 145 Reducing the amount of funds in Treasury issues by that
amount would be devastating.
Third, exclusion of the Japanese from the primary market would
simply shift Japanese interest towards the secondary market. While
Japanese brokers would make less profit from buying and selling
Treasury issues in secondary markets, Japanese institutional investors
could still purchase the issues they would require. As an alternative
to the secondary market, the Japanese could always purchase other
types of long term debt. This would be inconsistent with the purpose
of the Act because while Japanese dealers would complain, to the Jap-
anese government, that they are being denied access, Japanese inves-
tors would not.
Fourth, the Act only addresses one area of restriction, the Japa-
nese government bond market. The Act does not address Japanese
restrictions on United States firms opening an office in Japan, mem-
bership on Japanese securities exchanges, or Japan's fixed commission
rates. Unequal treatment would only be remedied, if at all, in the
government securities market. Such a remedy is inconsistent with the
141. Note, supra note 135, at 264.
142. Id.
143. 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1401, 1402 (Nov. 16, 1988).
144. Id.
145. Japanese Slow Investments in U.S. Markets, L.A. Times, Nov. 7, 1987, pt. IV, at 2,
col. 1.
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findings of the Act that restrictions exist in other areas. 146
Fifth, the Act fails to address the situation where a Japanese firm
acquires, either in whole or in part, a United States government secur-
ities dealer who has achieved primary dealer status. For example, on
December 19, 1988, the Federal Reserve Board approved Fuji Bank
Ltd.'s application to acquire 24.9% of the voting shares of Kleinwort
Benson Government Securities Inc. 147 The majority of the Board
held that the Primary Dealer's Act of 1988 did not bar the acquisi-
tion. 148 The Board based its holding on grounds that the Act does not
become effective until August 23, 1989.149 The Board indicated that
even after the effective date it would not be required, by the Act, to
deny such an acquisition unless it had first determined that Japan
"does not accord United States institutions the same competitive op-
portunites it affords to domestic companies in its government debt
markets." 150
The Board's decision leads to the sixth, and most compelling rea-
son why the Act will be ineffective. The Act does not define what is
meant by "same competitive opportunities."' 15 1 Was the intent of
Congress to rectify only those inequalities in the government securi-
ties markets, or in all areas of unequal treatment? What standard will
146. See Primary Dealer's Act, supra note 10, § 3502(a).
147. Fed Lets Fuji Bank Buy Shares of Chicago-Based Primary Dealer, 21 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 27 (Jan. 6, 1989). Previously, in February 1988, another Japanese Bank, Long
Term Credit Bank of Japan, applied to the Fed for permission to buy an existing primary
dealer, Greenwich Capital Markets Inc. Long Term Credit Bank of Japan Seeks to Buy United
States Primary Dealer, 20 See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 301 (Feb. 26, 1988).
148. 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 27 (Jan. 6, 1989).
149. Id. Aside from the Board's holding regarding interpretation of the Primary Dealer's
Act, the Board held that Fuji was in compliance with the captial requirements the Board set
forth in the Board's Capital Adequacy Guidelines. While Fuji's publicly reported capital was
less than required, the Board made an adjustment after taking into consideration Japanese
banking and accounting practices. Id.
150. Id.
151. See Primary Dealer's Act, supra note 10, § 3502(b)(1). The Reagan Administration
objected to the Primary Dealer's Act not only because of its protectionist nature, but also
because the Act did not give the administration discretion to determine whether Japanese
markets granted equal access. See Trade Bill Conferees Agree on Limits For Foreign Dealers in
United States Securities, Wall St. J., Mar. 31, 1988, at 3, col. 4. Yet, as a result of Congress'
failure to define "same competitive opportunities," Congress has, in effect, given the adminis-
tration discretion to determine whether equal access is present. For example, see text accom-
panying notes 143-146. Paul Volcker, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve, and Gerald Corrigan, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, opposed
the Act for similar reasons. See Trade Bill May Strip Japanese Firms of Gov't Securities Dealer
Status, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 443 (Mar. 27, 1987); New York Fed President Opposes
Primary-Dealer Restrictions in Trade Bill, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 671 (May 8, 1987).
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satisfy the "same competitive opportunities" wording? Do we require
total equality, or just a good faith effort in achieving total equality?
Even the Act's author, Representative Charles Schumer of New
York, doesn't know what would be required to satisfy the "same com-
petitive opportunities" standard. 152
Seventh, the Act does not provide for the situation where a Japa-
nese firm has previously acquired a United States primary dealer. In
fact, the Act specifically exempts such an acquisition under its
"grandfather clause."' 153 Under the clause, if such an acquisition oc-
curred prior to July 31, 1987, and if the acquiror and the target pri-
mary dealer notified the Federal Reserve Bank of New York of the
proposed acquisition prior to that date, the acquisition will not be
reversed. 154 For example, on June 6, 1988 the Federal Reserve Board
approved Sanwa Bank Ltd.'s application to acquire Brophy, Gestal,
Knight & Co., L.P., as well as Long Term Credit Bank of Japan's
application to acquire Greenwich Capital Markets pursuant to the
clause. 155
If this type of protectionist legislation is to be effective it must
prevent the Japanese from buying any United States government se-
curities, both in the primary and secondary markets. As a result, Jap-
anese dealers and investors would pressure the Japanese government
to open its markets to United States dealers. However, such legisla-
tion totally restricting the Japanese from purchasing any United
States government securities would be catastrophic. For example, Ja-
pan contributes almost $40 billion a year towards financing of the
United States deficit. 156 To reduce the amount of foreign funds in the
United States markets by that amount would be cataclismic. 157
152. See Japan Will Use Price Auction System to Sell 40 Percent of New 10- Year Bonds, 20
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1401, 1402 (Sept. 16, 1988).
153. See Primary Dealer's Act, supra note 10, § 3502(b)(2).
154. Id. See also Fed Says Two Japanese Banks May Acquire U.S. Primary Dealers, De-
spite Trade Bill, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 888 (June 10, 1988).
155. 20 See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 888 (June 10, 1988). It should be noted that while
both banks did not meet the 5.5% minimum capital level, specified in the Federal Reserve
Board's Capital Adequacy Guidelines, they were granted primary dealer status after the Board
made adjustments for Japanese banking and accounting standards. Id. It appears that Sanwa,
Long Term Credit Bank, and Industrial Bank of Japan will be allowed to continue their pri-
mary dealer status under the Act's grandfather acquisition provision. New York Fed Adds
Three Primary Dealers to List But Passes Over Japanese House, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
1066 (July 8, 1988).
156. Japanese Slow Investments in U.S. Markets, L.A. Times, Nov. 7, 1987, pt. IV, at 2,
col. 1.
157. It has been speculated whether transference of foreign capital out of United States
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The Primary Dealer's Act takes the form of a final attempt to
reduce the trade imbalance with protectionist policy. What the au-
thors of the Act fail to remember is that the Japanese need the United
States as much as the United States needs the Japanese. 158 The
United States and Japanese financial markets are so closely related
that they will become almost interdependent in the future. 159 So
much so that the Japanese and United States will have to cooper-
ate. 160 As Japan emerges as a leading world financial power it is un-
wise to unilaterally force reciprocity. A more effective solution could
be derived from actual Japanese participation and cooperation.
IV. COOPERATION TO ELIMINATE RESTRICTIONS
In order to effectively eliminate Japanese restrictions on United
States firms attempting to enter Japanese securities markets, the
United States and Japan must commence negotiations aimed at reci-
procity. An example of the resulting effectiveness of such negotia-
tions is exemplified by the Japan-U.S. Agreement on Semiconductor
Trade' 61 and the Japan-United States: Memorandum of the U.S. Se-
curities Exchange Commission and the Securities Bureau of the Japa-
nese Ministry of Finance on the Sharing of Information.162 Both
agreements have resulted from negotiations between the two countries
which provide for implementation, verification, and enforcement.
The Agreement on Semiconductor Trade was developed as a re-
sult of complaints by the United States semiconductor industry that
Japanese computer chip manufacturers were impeding United States
semiconductor manufacturers' access to Japanese computer chip mar-
kets and that Japanese manufacturers were dumping semiconductors
on world markets thus violating United States dumping laws. 163 By
entering the agreement the United States semiconductor industry sub-
stantially increased its sales position in Japanese semiconductor mar-
financial markets was one cause of the recent market break on Black Monday, October 19,
1987. See Volatility and Panic in the Nations Financial Markets: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 49-50 (1987) (state-
ment of David S. Ruder, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission).
158. Trade and Competitiveness Hearing, supra note 6, at 206.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Agreement on Semiconductor Trade, Sept. 2, 1986, United States-Japan, 25 I.L.M.
1408 [hereinafter Semiconductor Agreement].
162. May 23, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 1429 [hereinafter Japanese MOU].
163. Semiconductor Agreement, supra note 161, at 1408.
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kets.' 64 The agreement specifically provides for the establishment of
an organization in Japan which will "provide sales assistance for for-
eign semiconductor producers as they attempt to penetrate Japanese
markets."' 65 The agreement also provides for a monitoring of costs
and prices of such products exported from Japan to the United
States. 66 In the event that members of either countries' semiconduc-
tor industry fail to comply, enforcement will be taken pursuant to the
laws of Japan and the United States. 67 In addition, if either country
breaches the agreement, a procedure for further negotiations is
provided.'48
An alternative to such a formal treaty is a "memorandum of un-
derstanding" between the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission and the Japanese Ministry of Finance. A memorandum
of understanding is an agreement negotiated between The Commis-
sion and its counterpart in a foreign country. 69 To date, the Com-
mission has only entered into four such agreements.' 70 All of these
agreements have been in the area of insider trading. One such agree-
ment was entered into between the Commission and the Securities
Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Finance.' 71 The agreement recog-
nizes the fact that the internationalization of securities markets has
resulted in the trading of securities of one country upon the securities
exchanges in the other.' 72 As a result, the agreement provides for a
sharing of surveillance and investigatory information between the two
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1411.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Smith, The Saga ofMOUs, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 28, 1988, at 5, col. 1.
170. United Kingdom-United States: Memorandum of Understanding on Exchange of In-
formation in Matters Relating to Securities and Futures, Sept. 23, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 1431; Japan-
United States: Memorandum of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission and the
Securities Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Finance on the Sharing of Information, May 23,
1986, 25 I.L.M. 1429; Switzerland-United States: Memorandum of Understanding to Establish
Mutually Acceptable Means for Improving International Law Enforcement Cooperation in the
Field of Insider Trading, Aug. 31, 1982, 22 I.L.M. 1; Canada-United States: Memorandum of
Understanding on Exchange of Information, Jan. 7, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 412. For a discussion of
the United Kingdom, Japan, and Swiss memorandums, see Note, Enforcing Securities Regula-
tions Through Bilateral Agreements with the United Kingdom and Japan: An Interim Measure
or a Solution, 23 TEx. INT'L L. J. 251 (1988). For a discussion of the Switzerland-United
States Memorandum, see Comment, 15 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 135 (1985).
171. Japanese MOU, supra note 162.
172. Id. at 1429.
1989]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
agencies.17 3 While the agreement hardly provides specific require-
ments for the sharing of information, as do similar agreements,
1 74 it
does establish a basis for cooperation.
Attempts by the United States and Japan to enter either a treaty
or a memorandum of understanding would be a major step towards
reducing the trade deficit and improving economic relations between
the two countries. The benefits of entering a treaty or memorandum,
rather than unilateral action, are compelling.
V. UNITED STATES-JAPAN: MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
TO ESTABLISH EQUAL ACCESS TO UNITED STATES AND
JAPANESE SECURITIES MARKETS
In an effort to facilitate access of United States firms to Japanese
securities markets, Japan and the United States must enter into an
agreement similar to either the Semiconductor Agreement or one of
the existing MOUs. The end result of either type of agreement would
be the same. However, it would seem more logical for this agreement
to be similar in form to the memorandum of understanding. The par-
ties to such an agreement would be the United States Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve, and the Japanese Ministry of Finance. The agreement would
serve as a basis for eliminating Japanese restrictions on United States
firms in Japanese securities markets and restrictions on Japanese firms
in United States securities markets. The content of this agreement
would address the four principle areas of unequal treatment discussed
in this Comment, Japanese restrictions in terms of licensing,175 lim-
ited exchange membership,' 76 fixed commission rates, 7 7 and the gov-
ernment securities markets.17
8
First, Japanese licensing requirements for United States firms
would be totally abolished. Provisions of the agreement would set
forth that the Securities and Exchange Commission and Ministry of
Finance share information regarding a firm's status as a broker-dealer
or licensed firm. The United States would grant broker-dealer status
to Japanese firms in the United States so long as the firm had already
been granted a license by the Japanese Ministry of Finance. Likewise,
173. Id.
174. See supra note 170.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 16-7 1.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 72-85.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 86-94.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 95-126.
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Japan would grant licensed firm status to United States firms so long
as the firm is, and continues to be, a registered broker-dealer. Of
course, this would not eliminate the registrant/licensee's duties under
the other securities laws, only the initial registration/license require-
ments. Final approval would be conditional upon certification of such
status by the appropriate country's administrative body, the Securities
Exchange Commission or the Ministry of Finance, and other specifics
to be negotiated between the two agencies. Of course, in the event
that status in the firm's home country is revoked, limited, or censured,
their status in the other country would also.
Second, in the area of exchange membership, the agreement
would provide that Japanese and United States securities exchanges
grant reciprocal membership privileges. For instance, a United States
firm, which is a member of the New York Stock Exchange, would
only be granted membership on the Tokyo Stock Exchange if the New
York Stock Exchange granted membership to a Japanese firm that
was already a member of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Of course, this
would not only be prospective, but also retroactive to take into ac-
count current membership.
Third, in terms of brokerage commissions, the Japanese Ministry
of Finance must agree to abolish fixed brokerage commission require-
ments. This would allow both United States and Japanese firms the
ability to compete for Japanese clients by offering lower commissions.
This provision would also be beneficial to existing Japanese firms be-
cause they would be able to compete with other Japanese firms for
Japanese customers.
Lastly, the agreement would provide that the Japanese adopt a
policy of national treatment regarding participation in the Japanese
government bond market. Of course, the government securities mar-
kets of the two countries differ substantially. However, this provision
of the memorandum would expand upon the underlying principles set
forth in section 3502(4)(c) of the Primary Dealers Act. For example,
so long as United States and Japanese firms are allowed the opportu-
nity to obtain government securities of the other country in the pri-
mary market there would be no problem. However, if the Japanese
bond syndicate actually prevented United States firms from participa-
tion in Japanese bond markets the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York and the Securities and Exchange Commission would prevent
Japanese firms in the United States from participation in both pri-
mary and secondary government securities markets.
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Of course, the above suggested provisions are rather simplistic
and would be difficult to negotiate with the Japanese because of the
long history of such restrictions in the Japanese markets. But any
attempt at bilateral elimination of such restrictions would be better
than unilateral action.
The final result of such an agreement, addressing the above re-
strictions together or seperately, hopefully, would be the elimination
of restictions on United States firms in Japanese securities markets.
As a result of elimination of such restrictions, United States firms
could obtain a large share of the Japanese securities markets causing
an inflow of funds to the United States which could possibly offset the
trade imbalance between the United States and Japan.
IV. CONCLUSION
Until an effective method of reducing the federal budget deficit is
developed we must continue attempts to eliminate Japanese barriers
to trade in order to reduce the United States trade deficit with Japan.
While such barriers could be reduced in several industries, significant
reductions in the United States trade deficit with Japan would occur if
the Japanese eliminated restrictions in Japanese securities markets.
The key to eliminating barriers to Japanese securities markets
does not rest upon a unilateral coercive form of reciprocity but upon
mutual cooperation by both the United States and Japan.
James W. Bates
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